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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to examine: (1) to what extent Canadian oil and gas firms have 
adhered to the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountant proposed guidelines respecting cli-
mate change disclosures in their annual reports, and (2) whether the disclosures of these firms 
can be influenced by their media visibility, the presence and operating characteristics of an en-
vironmental committee within the board of directors, their ownership structure, their audit 
firms, their political exposure and media visibility. The results show that the level of disclosure 
is very low; however, when the board of directors has an environment committee, the level of 
disclosure is higher. This is also the case for firms having significant political exposure and 
strong media visibility, and for those with a widely held ownership structure. Whether or not 
the audit firm is one of the Big Four, does not make any difference in the level of disclosure. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
According the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change1, the warming of the 
climate system is irrefutable, as is evi-
denced by observations of increases in 
global average air and ocean tempera-
tures, the widespread melting of snow 
and ice and the rising global average sea 
level (IPCC, 2007). This global warming 
is partly due to greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions resulting from human activi-
ties (IPCC, 2007). For some organiza-
tions, this trend can have serious reper-
cussions. Sectors such as agriculture, 
insurance, tourism and real estate face 
potential risks from climate change, such 
as a rising sea level and more frequent 
and intense storms (Kolk, Levy and 
Pinkse, 2008). For companies emitting 
greenhouse gases, the consequences can 
be even more numerous, including in-
creased operating costs, reduced de-
mand, reputational risk, legal proceed-
ings, and fines and penalties. What’s 
more, for these firms, this new reality 
changes stakeholders’ information needs 
respecting their greenhouse gas emis-
sions. These companies’ stakeholders, 
notably investors, want to know not only 
how much GHG is being emitted, but 
also how firm managers use or take into 
account GHG emissions in their strate-
gic planning. They also wish to know 
whether the firms evaluate the ensuing 
risks and financial repercussions, as well 
as whether they maintain data and con-
trol systems to quantify and control 
these emissions (Canadian Performance 
Reporting Board [CPRB], 2005).  
In Canada2, as in other countries, securi-
ties regulators have long recognized the 
need for companies to provide environ-
mental disclosures that would be mate-
rial to investor decision making (CPRB, 
2005). These disclosures are required in 
Annual Information Forms3, in financial 
statements or in the Management Dis-
cussion and Analysis (MD&A)4 section 
of annual reports (CPRB, 2005). Disclo-
sures on climate change and GHG are, 
among others, covered by rules requiring 
public companies to publish information 
about the risks they face. The National
Instrument 51-102 Continuous Disclo-
sure Obligations adopted by the Ontario 
Securities Commission (OSC, 2004), as 
well as counterparts in other Canadian 
provinces, require public companies to 
dedicate a portion of their MD&A to a 
description of the risks that can materi-
ally affect their future performance.5 To 
help firms comply with these require-
ments, the Canadian Institute of Char-
tered Accountants (CICA) published 
(CPRB, 2005) a Discussion Brief ad-
dressing these types of disclosures in 
October 2005.  
The CICA initiative is one of the first 
that addresses GHG disclosures pre-
sented in the MD&A. This initiative, in 
conjunction with Canada’s sizeable oil 
and gas industry, provides us with the 
opportunity to examine the characteris-
tics of GHG disclosures of corporations 
that generate significant quantities of 
GHG. This study thus has two objec-
1   The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) was set up jointly by the World Meteorological 
Organization and the United Nations Environment 
Program to provide an authoritative international state-
ment of scientific understanding of climate change. 
 2   Canada has signed and ratified the Kyoto Protocol. 
 3   This document is intended to provide supplementary 
an annual information required by securities regulators. 
4   The MD&A is a report that corporate management 
presents in its annual report to explain the organization’s 
current financial situation, performance and future pros-
pects. For a review of past studies on MD&A disclo-
sures; see Cole and Jones (2005). 
5   Annual MD&A reporting requirements, similar to 
those adopted by the SEC in 1980, were first instituted 
in Canada by the OSC in 1989 (Clarkson, Kao, & 
Richardson, 1999). According to the regulation, risks 
and uncertainties were one of the specific areas to be 
addressed in the MD&A. 
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tives. First, to examine to what extent 
Canadian oil and gas firms have adhered 
to the proposed guidelines respecting 
climate change disclosures in the 
MD&A section or in other parts of their 
annual reports. Second, to determine 
whether these disclosures seem to be 
influenced by media visibility, the pres-
ence and operation of an environment 
committee within the board of directors, 
ownership structure, the size of the audit 
firm, and the companies’ political expo-
sure.  
 
Like the other MD&A disclosures, the 
narrative nature of climate change dis-
closures makes them a challenging sub-
ject for research. According Cole and 
Jones (2005), it isn’t easy to assess the 
quality of this type of disclosure because 
it’s impossible to know what the firm's 
disclosures would have been if they had 
been complete, unbiased and accurate. 
The CICA Discussion Brief can serve as 
reference for assessing completeness. In 
the same vein, the relationships between 
climate change disclosures and the 
firms’ different specific contextual vari-
ables can help assess the potential biases 
of these disclosures. If the firm's disclo-
sure decisions are tied to these contex-
tual variables, we may conclude that 
these disclosures are not neutral. This 
study thus supplements several previous 
studies on the quality of MD&A disclo-
sures and on the determinants of specific 
MD&A disclosures (Cole and Jones, 
2005). It contributes empirical observa-
tions that make it possible to document 
corporate practices in relation to this 






Background to Climate Change Dis-
closures
According to Eccles, Krzus and 
Serafeim (2011), investors are increas-
ingly interested in environmental, social 
and governance information. In recent 
years, in addition to the market securi-
ties regulation, several initiatives have 
been introduced to improve firms’ re-
porting of this type of information. The 
Global Reporting Initiative's Sustainabil-
ity Reporting Guidelines, the world’s 
most widely used framework, is one ex-
ample.6 This Reporting framework sets 
out the principles and perform-
ance indicators that organizations can 
use to measure and report their eco-
nomic, environmental, and social per-
formance in stand-alone sustainability or 
corporate social responsibility reports 
(GRI, 2011). In 2010, 1,824 organiza-
tions around the world were recognized 
as using these Reporting Guidelines for 
their sustainability or corporate social 
responsibility reports (GRI, 2011). Cli-
mate change disclosures are, at least in 
part, covered by these Reporting Guide-
lines. However, up until now the volun-
tary publication of sustainability reports 
has been limited to large organizations.  
 
The Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) is 
another initiative that has been devel-
oped to respond to stakeholders’ infor-
mation needs in terms of climate change 
disclosures (Kolk et al., 2008). The CDP 
is an independent not-for-profit organi-
zation that developed a database of cor-
porate climate change information from 
over 3,000 organizations in some 60 
6 The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) is a network-
based organization that developed a sustainability re-
porting framework through consensus seeking from 
global business, civil society, and labour, academic and 
professional institutions (www.globalreporting.org/
Home). 
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countries around the world (CBC, 2011). 
This database covers a firm's carbon 
strategies, GHG emissions, corporate 
arrangements for oversight of climate 
change and environmental risk, a firm's 
perception of risks and opportunities, 
and actions under way or planned to 
manage these risks and seize the oppor-
tunities. The information results from 
annual surveys to which a large sample 
of major publicly traded companies was 
invited to respond. This information is 
made available to institutional investors, 
corporations, policymakers and their 
advisors, public sector organizations, 
government bodies, academics and the 
public (CBC, 2011). Similarly to the 
GRI, firms’ responses to the CDP are 
also voluntary, which means that the 
information is limited to a relatively 
small group of organizations. 
 
The voluntary nature of environmental 
disclosures has been addressed in past 
studies from four different theoretical 
perspectives. The economic perspective 
predicts that firms with real and well-
founded "good news" are likely to dis-
close this news to differentiate them-
selves from firms with "bad news" or 
"unfounded news" that cannot easily 
imitate them (Clarkson, Li, Richardson 
and Vasvari, 2008). A firm may also 
decide to retain information if it could 
be detrimental to the firm’s position or 
reputation or if stakeholders are not 
aware that it has such information (Dye, 
1985; Verrecchia, 1983).  
 
According the legitimacy theory, organi-
zations continually seek to ensure that 
they are perceived as operating within 
the bounds and norms of their respective 
societies. They attempt to ensure that 
stakeholders perceive their activities as 
"legitimate" (Deegan and Unerman, 
2011). Environmental disclosures are 
one way for an organization to obtain 
this legitimacy.  
 
Lindblom (1993) identifies four disclo-
sure strategies that organizations can 
take to obtain, maintain, or restore their 
legitimacy. They can: (1) seek to edu-
cate and inform their "relevant publics" 
about changes in their actual perform-
ance; (2) seek to change the perceptions 
that their "relevant publics" have of 
them, but not change their actual behav-
iour; (3) seek to manipulate perception 
by deflecting attention from the issue of 
concern into other areas, and (4) seek to 
change external expectations of their 
performance (Deegan and Unerman, 
2011).  
 
Under the stakeholder theory, because 
different stakeholder groups have differ-
ent views about how an organization 
should conduct its operations, various 
social contracts will be "negotiated" with 
different stakeholder groups, rather than 
one contract with society in general as 
posited by the legitimacy theory 
(Deegan and Unerman, 2011). Finally, 
other researchers claim that environ-
mental disclosures can be a function of 
differences in political, social, economic 
and cultural environments (Freedman 
and Jaggi, 2011) or other corporate gov-
ernance practices (Prado-Lorenzo and 
Garcia-Sanchez, 2010; Rankin, Windsor 
and Wahyuni, 2011). Studies on climate 
change disclosures have to date mainly 
been conducted from the latter perspec-
tive. 
 
As concerns voluntary climate change or 
GHG disclosures, Freedman and Jaggi 
(2005) have examined whether firms 
from countries that ratified the Kyoto 
Protocol have more elaborate disclosures 
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than firms in other countries. The disclo-
sures are then included in the annual 
reports, environmental reports and on 
the websites of the world’s largest com-
panies on Fortune's list. Their results 
corroborate their expectations. Further-
more, a company’s size and activity sec-
tor are related to the scope of the disclo-
sures. Similar results were observed by 
Freedman and Jaggi (2011) with more 
recent data (2007-2008 compared to 
2003) and including the climate change 
disclosures available in the CDP. In this 
last study, climate change disclosures 
are more elaborate in the countries that 
ratified the Kyoto Protocol and set limits 
on greenhouse gas emissions.  
 
The differences noted between firms’ 
climate change disclosures led Freedman 
and Jaggi (2011) to conclude that man-
datory disclosure requirements may be 
needed so that investors can make in-
formed investment decisions. Similar 
results were also observed by Prado-
Lorenzo, Rodriguez-Dominguez, 
Gallego-Alvarez and Garcia-Sanchez 
(2009), who analyzed the relationship 
between climate changes disclosures 
presented on firms’ websites. Size, ac-
tivity sector (especially chemicals, met-
als, mining, motor vehicles and parts, 
and utilities), and the fact that the com-
pany has its headquarters in a country 
that has ratified, approved, adhered to or 
accepted the Kyoto Protocol are posi-
tively related to the scope of the volun-
tary climate change disclosures pre-
sented on the firms’ websites.  
 
Rankin et al. (2011) have examined 
whether companies' greenhouse emis-
sion disclosures included in their annual 
reports or stand-alone environment or 
sustainability reports are associated with 
environmental management systems, 
corporate governance quality, environ-
mental management committees, guid-
ance provided by the Global Reporting 
Initiative and participation in the CDP. 
Their results show that a firm's decision 
to disclose information on greenhouse 
emissions is related to the implementa-
tion of an environmental management 
system, the quality of corporate govern-
ance, participation in and publicly avail-
able disclosures to the CDP, size, and 
the energy, mining and industrial sec-
tors. Except for the quality of corporate 
governance and environmental manage-
ment committees, their results are same 
for the extent and credibility of these 
disclosures measured using an index 
based on ISO 14064-1. 
 
In examining the factors associated with 
the US S&P 500 firms' decisions to par-
ticipate in the CDP, Stanny and Ely 
(2008) found that size, previous partici-
pation and foreign sales are positively 
related to a firm's decision to respond to 
the fifth CDP questionnaire. Prado-
Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez (2010) 
studied the impact of several variables 
relating to corporate governance prac-
tices on participation in the CDP, more 
particularly the percentage of independ-
ent directors, the holding of the position 
of CEO and Chairman of the board by 
the same person, the percentage of 
women directors, the firms’ characteris-
tics and the characteristics of the country 
in which they operate. Their findings 
show that the larger and most profitable 
firms disseminate a greater volume of 
information. The observed relationship 
with other variables seems less than con-
clusive.       
 
Overall, these studies’ results support 
the market securities regulation and ac-
counting standards implication for these 
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types of disclosures. Accordingly, in 
October 2005, the CICA published the 
Discussion Brief on MD&A disclosure 
about the financial impact of climate 
change and other environmental issues 
that specifically covered climate change 
information as required to be disclosed 
under the National Instrument 51-102 
Continuous Disclosure Obligations.  
However, although the request for risk 
information concerning climate change 
is formalized, the descriptive nature of 
this type of disclosure allows managers 
some discretion in applying the guid-
ance. Thus, as is the case for other vol-
untary disclosures respecting climate 
change or greenhouse emissions, the 
extent to which organizations actually 
follow the formulated guidelines may be 
questioned. This is the first objective of 
this study. 
 
The second objective is to examine 
whether these disclosures appear to be 
influenced by the presence and operation 
of an environment committee, audit firm 
size, media visibility, ownership struc-
ture, and the companies’ political expo-
sure. Otherwise, managers’ discretionary 
power cannot be unlimited and should 
normally be exercised within established 
parameters set out by the board of direc-
tors and the auditor. If the firm’s activi-
ties are subject to climate change risks, 
managers’ disclosure decisions can be 
influenced by the importance attributed 
to them by the board of directors since 
one of its responsibilities is to approve 
the contents of the MD&A before publi-
cation. In firms where this risk may be 
significant the board of directors may 
even be expected to have established an 
environment committee to oversee this 
issue and other environment-related con-
cerns. Therefore, the relationship be-
tween the existence and operation of an 
environment committee within the board 
of directors and the scope of the climate 
change disclosures is worth examining. 
 
Financial statement auditors can also 
influence the scope of voluntary disclo-
sures included the MD&A. According to 
Clarkson, Fergusson and Hall (2003), 
one way for auditors to discourage liti-
gation is to encourage their client firms 
to disclose more information about the 
threats they faced. In examining the vol-
untary disclosures concerning Year 2000 
remediation in annual reports, it was 
noted that the companies whose auditors 
had a greater reputation at stake (the Big 
6 audit firms) disclose more information. 
As mentioned above, the risks related to 
climate change can be highly significant 
for a number of organizations. Large 
audit firms are more likely to wish to 
reduce any risk of litigation by encour-
aging their clients to more closely com-
ply with disclosure recommendations, 
even though they may be voluntary.  
 
Numerous studies have observed a posi-
tive relationship between firm size and 
environmental disclosures by including 
climate change disclosures (Stanny and 
Ely, 2008; Prado-Lorenzo et al., 2009; 
Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez, 
2010; Rankin et al., 2011). Large firms 
are likely to receive more attention from 
the media, policy makers, and regula-
tors, leading to higher levels of volun-
tary environmental disclosures in order 
to avoid being penalised by this political 
exposure (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; 
Prado-Lorenzo et al., 2009). As for cli-
mate change and GHG disclosures in the 
Canadian context, it may be said that the 
larger the firm, the greater the pressure 
to comply with the proposed disclosure 
guidelines and thus prevent the imple-
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mentation of more rigorous and more 
constraining requirements (Freedman 
and Jaggi, 2005; Cormier and Gordon, 
2001; Bewley and Li, 2000; Alnajjar, 
2000; Clarkson, Kao and Richardson, 
1999). 
 
A firm’s level of climate change and 
GHG disclosures could also be affected 
by the active oversight of stakeholders 
and the degree of monitoring by the me-
dia or other means. Since this monitor-
ing focuses on the activities of the firm, 
it can only reap the benefits of publish-
ing more information (Cormier and 
Magnan, 2003). Several studies found 
that increased media attention, which 
enhances firms’ visibility, leads to 
higher levels of environmental disclo-
sure (Cormier and Magnan, 2003; 
Cormier and Gordon, 2001; Brown and 
Deegan, 1998; Deegan and Gordon, 
1996). We will analyse this possibility. 
Finally, we extend our analysis to in-
clude ownership structure. When man-
agers decide to voluntarily disclose in-
formation, whether it be environmental 
or any other type of information, they 
choose to reduce the information asym-
metry between themselves and the 
shareholders (Lajili and Zeghal, 2005; 
Broberg, Tagesson and Collin, 2010). 
Moreover, this information asymmetry 
may be more or less important depend-
ing on whether a firm’s ownership is 
closely or widely held. If a firm’s own-
ership is closely held, there is less pres-
sure to release information publicly 
since the principal shareholders already 
have access to it. According to the eco-
nomic theories, when a firm's ownership 
is widely held, its managers decide to 
voluntarily disclose information to re-
duce information asymmetry or again, 
according the legitimacy theory, to take 
advantage of the situation to manage or 
acquire the "legitimacy".  
 
Thus, our second research objective is to 
examine the link between climate 
change and GHG disclosures, and differ-
ent characteristics of the firm such as: 
a. the presence of an active environ-
ment committee within the board 
of directors;  
b. the size of the audit firm; 
c. the firm’s political exposure;  
d. the firm’s media visibility; and 
e. the firm’s ownership structure. 
 
2.  Research Design 
Sample
Our analysis is based on the climate 
change disclosures presented in the 
MD&A or in the other parts of the an-
nual report of Canadian public oil and 
gas corporations7 in 2007. These firms 
are unanimously recognized as impor-
tant emitters of GHG.8 They also in 
large part contribute to Canada’s posi-
tion as the world’s seventh largest oil 
producer (Natural Resources Canada, 
2011).  
 
The choice of restricting the sample to 
oil and gas firms is motivated by various 
arguments. First of all, Cole and Jones 
(2005) observed that the nature of the 
information set out in MD&As varies 
considerably from one sector to another. 
As well, Cormier and Magnan (2003) 
note that disclosure models are particu-
lar to activity sectors. Therefore, Cole 
and Jones (2005) suggest targeting firms 
7 US Standard Industrial Classification Code 1311 
(Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas) and 1321 (Natural 
Gas Liquids).
 8    Between 2004 and 2007, emissions associated with 
mining, oil and gas extraction alone rose by 56.7%, 
largely due to increased activity at the Alberta oil sands 
(Environment Canada, 2007).  
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in the same sector where the presenta-
tions and definitions are more homoge-
neous, which helps prevent measure-
ment errors due to differing definitions. 
As well, this strategy enables us to more 
easily identify the trends of firms in a 
similar sector (Clarkson et al., 2008). 
Finally, by specifically studying disclo-
sures on climate change, our study al-
lows us to verify the degree of imple-
mentation of the CICA proposed guide-
lines (Clarkson et al., 2008).  
 
To be included in the sample, the firms 
had to meet the following criteria: (1) 
operate in the oil and gas sector and 
have production activities; (2) have its 
head office in Canada; (3) be listed on 
the Toronto Stock Exchange; and (4) 
have their 2007 annual report available 
in the SEDAR9 database. All the firms 
that meet these criteria are included in 
the sample. The final sample is com-
posed of 6410 Canadian public oil and 
gas firms with production activities.  
 
Disclosure measures 
To measure the extent of climate change 
disclosure, most of the research has used 
an index developed for the end of the 
analysis (Freedman and Jaggi, 2005; 
2011; Prado-Lorenzo et al., 2009; Ran-
kin et al., 2011). In the same vein, we 
developed a disclosure index using the 
content-analysis technique that focuses 
on the substance of what is disclosed 
rather than on counting the lines of dis-
closure (Freedman and Jaggi, 2005). The 
index is based on the CICA climate 
change disclosure recommendations. 
The CICA (CPRB, 200511) guidelines 
recommend disclosing and discussing 
climate change information relating to 
risk, strategy, key performance drivers, 
impacts and results. We analysed cli-
mate change disclosures for each firm, 
coded them in function of the proposed 
elements12 and weighted them according 
to the level of detail disclosed. Coding 
of the climate change disclosures was 
conducted independently by two re-
search assistants and, in case of dis-
agreement, the opinion of the professor 
in charge of data collection prevailed. 
The coding index is presented in the left-
hand side of the Table 1.    
 
Other variables measures 
 The firm’s environment commit-
tee within the board of directors: 
the presence (1) or absence (0) of 
a committee was noted. The level 
of activity of the environment 
committee was measured by the 
number of members, the number 
of independent directors, and the 
number of meetings.  
 The size of the firm’s auditor: 1 if 
one of the Big Four, otherwise 0.  
 The firm’s political exposure was 
measured by the size of the firm 
as expressed by its total assets 
(Stanny and Ely, 2008). 
 The firm’s media visibility was 
measured by the number of times 
a firm was mentioned in The
Globe and Mail in 2007 
(Gamerschlag, Moller and Ver-
beeten, 2011). The Globe and 
Mail is a newspaper with the 
largest business readership in 
Canada.  
9  SEDAR (System for Electronic Document Analysis 
and Retrieval) is the system used for electronically filing 
most securities-related information with the Canadian 
securities regulatory authorities (www.sedar.com). 
10 These firms are listed in the Appendix. 
11  The final version was adopted at the end of 2008 
(CICA, 2008).  
12    The data were collected in the MD&A and the other 
sections of the Annual Report, excluding the financial 
statements and their notes.  
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 The firm’s ownership structure 
was determined by tracking the 
mention of a principal share-
holder in the 2007 “Information 
circulars and proxy statements”. 
A firm that mentioned the pres-
ence of a shareholder holding 
more than 10% of voting shares 
was considered as a closely held 
ownership firm (0) and one that 
did not meet the criterion was 
considered as a widely held own-
ership firm (1).  
3.  Results and Discussion 
Descriptive statistics    
As indicated in the right-hand column of 
Table 1, a sizable percentage of firms 
disclose very limited information about 
climate change. For each of the five 
components studied, 57.81% do not dis-
close any information on the risks re-
lated to the regulation to reduce GHG; 
79.69% do not provide any information 
on their strategies to manage GHG; none 
of them mention any key performance 
Items Score % of firms 
Risk     
The firm does not disclose information on the risks related to the 
regulation to reduce GHG 0 57.81% 
The firm discloses a general statement that its GHG must now be 
managed as required by regulation 1 12.50 % 
The firm discloses the name of the regulation that requires it to man-
age its GHG 2 6.25 % 
The firm discloses the name of the regulation that requires it to man-
age its GHG and provides details on the regulation 3 23.44 % 
Strategy     
The firm does not provide information on its strategies to manage its 
GHG 0 79.69% 
The firm mentions that it has strategies to manage GHG without ex-
plaining them 1 3.12 % 
The firm explains its strategies to manage its GHG emissions 2 12.50 % 
The firm explains its strategies to manage its GHG emissions and 
discloses specific targets to achieve 3 4.69 % 
Key performance drivers     
The firm does not disclose any information on key performance driv-
ers 0 100% 
Impact     
The firm does not disclose the impact of the GHG regulation on its 
operations 0 65.62% 
The firm discloses the impact of the GHG regulation on its operations 1 34.38 % 
Results     
The firm does not disclose the results of the implementation of strate-
gies to reduce GHG 0 93.75% 
The firm discloses the results of the implementation of strategies to 
reduce GHG 1 6.25 % 
Table 1
Climate Change Disclosure Index 
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drivers; 65.62% do not disclose the im-
pact of the GHG legislation on their op-
erations; and, finally, 93.75% of them do 
not publish information on the results of 
the implementation of any strategy to 
reduce GHG. However, the index lists 
some items where a certain percentage 
of firms publish some information. Un-
der risk, 23.44% disclose the name of 
the regulation that requires them to man-
age their GHG and provide details on 
the regulation. Regarding strategy, 
12.50% explain their strategies to man-
age their GHG emissions and 34.38% 
disclose information on the impact of the 
GHG legislation on their operations.  
 
The values presented in the second col-
umn of Table 1 have been used to com-
pute a total score of disclosures on a 
scale from zero to eight (the sum of the 
maximum score for each of the catego-
Continuous variables Mean Stand. dev. Median Maximum Minimum 
Disclosure score 1.78 2.24 0 8 0 
Environment com-
mittee (23 firms) 
          
Number of mem-
bers 
3.74 1.48 3 8 2 
Independent mem-
bers 
79% 26.6% 94% 100% 0% 
Number of meet-
ings 
2.68 2.40 2 8 0 
Political exposure - 
assets ($’000s CAD) 377,632 931,725 281,225 46,565,326 31,235 
Media visibility 
(number of articles) 
26.14 59.72 4 319 0 
Sales ($’000s CAD) 2,138,573 5,742,666 86,889 25,069,000 1,273 
ROA -0,6% 11.8% 0% 32.0% -35.0% 
Stock yield 4.27% 55.25% -5.0% 238.0% -69.0% 







      
Big Four audit firm 58 90.63 %       
Non Big Four audit 
firm 
6 9.37 %       
Widely held owner-
ship 
23 35.94 %       
Closely held owner-
ship 
41 64.06 %       
Table 2  
Descriptive statistics (64 firms) 
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ries presented [Risk: 3; Strategy: 3; Key 
Performance Drivers: 0; Impact: 1;  
Results: 1]). The average score is very 
low at 1.78. 
 
Although the 64 firms in our sample are 
all active in the oil and gas sector, they 
vary significantly in terms of respective 
assets, sales and earnings, and measures 
of return. As presented in Table 2, total 
assets range from $31 million to $46 
billion and sales vary from $1 million to 
$25 billion. During the period under 
study, the measures of return are very 
high for some firms, while they are de-
finitively low for others (Table 2). 
Despite the fact that the environment 
should be a major concern, only 23 of 
the boards of directors of the 64 firms 
studied report having an environment 
committee. These committees are com-
prised of two to eight members (on aver-
  Means 
Big Four audit firm1 1.78   
Non Big Four audit firm 1.83   
With an environment committee 2.22   
No environment committee 1.54   
Significant political exposure 2.45 ** 
Less political exposure 1.15   
Significant media visibility 2.55 ** 
Less media visibility 1.06   
Widely held ownership 3.17 ** 
Closely held ownership 1.00   
** Significant difference at the 0.05 level (one-tail, t-test) 
1 The small number of firms audited by non Big Four firms make it impossible to carry out the 
statistical test on this item. 
Table 3
Disclosure scores 
age, less than four). Some 79% of these 
members are independent and one com-
mittee has no independent member. 
These committees meet less than three 
times a year, while one committee does 
not meet at all. Almost all of the firms 
(58 out of 64) are audited by one of the 
Big Four audit firms. In 2007, each firm 
was the subject of an average of 26 arti-
cles in The Globe and Mail. One firm 
received a substantial amount of atten-
tion with 319 articles, whereas another 
received no attention whatsoever. Re-
garding ownership structure, 23 firms 
are widely held, and 41 are closely held.  
 
Main results 
Table 3 presents the mean comparison of 
the total score of disclosures on a scale 
from zero to eight. Although the overall 
disclosure scores are quite low, signifi-
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cant differences were noted as to what 
was expected in terms of political expo-
sure, media visibility and firm owner-
ship. Contrary to our expectation, the 
level of disclosure of the companies au-
dited by a Big Four firm is lower than 
that noted for companies not audited by 
a Big Four firm, even though the differ-
ence is very slight. However, the small 
number of firms audited by a firm that 
does not belong to the Big Four (six 
firms) makes it difficult to carry out the 
statistical tests.  
 
To take our study further, we created 
binary variables from the Climate 
Change Disclosure items: overall disclo-
sure, risk, strategies and impacts. Since 
none or very few firms disclose informa-
tion about their key performance drivers 
or the results of their implementing 
strategies to reduce GHG, these items 
are not included in the analysis. These 
four variables are operationalized as fol-
lows: 
 Overall disclosure: 1 if any men-
tion of risk related to GHG or the 
firm’s strategies to manage its 
GHG or the impact of the GHG 
regulation on its operation or the 
results of the implementation of 
strategies to reduce its GHG; 
otherwise, 0 (28 vs. 36 firms). 
 Risk disclosure: 1, for any men-
tion of risk related to GHG; oth-
erwise, 0 (27 vs. 37 firms). 
 Strategies disclosure: 1 for any 
mention of its strategies to man-
age its GHG; otherwise, 0 (13 vs. 
51 firms). 
 Impact disclosure: 1 for any 
mention the impact of the GHG 
regulation on its operations; oth-
erwise, 0 (22 vs. 40 firms). 
 
We cross-tabled these variables with the 
explicative nominal variables, environ-
ment committee and ownership struc-
ture, and applied Chi2 tests to analyse 
the links13 (Table 4). We also compared 
  Overall  
disclosure 








Non Big Four audi-
tors1 
33.33% (2/6) 33.33% (2/6) 16.67% (1/6) 33.33% (2/6) 
     









41.46 (17/41) 41.46% (17/41) 12.20% (5/41) 34.15%(14/41) 













26.83% (11/41) 24.39% (10/41) 12.20% (5/41) 21.95%(9/41) 
** Significant difference at the 0.05 level,* at the 0.10 level (Chi2-test) 
1 The small number of firms audited by non Big Four firms makes impossible to carry out the statistical test on this 
item. 
2 The small number of observations makes it impossible to carry out this test. 
Table 4
Proportion and number of firms disclosing information by firm characteristics  
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the means of the explicative continuous 
variables representing the environmental 
committee’s characteristics, the political 
exposure and the media visibility of the 
firm in Table 5. The results of the analy-
ses presented in Table 4 confirm the pre-
ceding findings. For each type of disclo-
sure, the firms audited by a Big Four 
audit firm, those whose board of direc-
tors has put in place an environment 
committee and those that are widely held 
disclose the information more fre-
  Overall 
Disclosure   
Risk 
Disclosure      
Strategies disclo-
sure     
Impact 
Disclosure   
  0 1   0 1      0 1     0 1   
Environment commit-
tee (23 firms)                              
Number of mem-
bers 3.08 4.46 ** 3.08 4.60  **   3.47 4.25 **   3.40 4.38 ** 
Independent
members 70.3% 87.0%   69.5% 89.7%  **   73.2% 87.9%     72.5% 89.3% * 
Number of meet-
ings 2.56 2.8   2.5 2.89      2.27 3.25 *   2.67 2.71   
Political exposure –     
assets ($’000,000s 
CAD) 
971 7,130 ** 1,530 6,590  **   1,150 13,500 **   1.980 6.890 * 
Media visibility 
(number of articles) 7.17 50.54 ** 8.87 49.82  **   9.22 92.53 **   14.12 49.09 * 
Financial variables                              
ROA -1.9% 1.1% ** -1.5% 0.6%  *   -2.4% 6.4% **   -0.8% 0.0%   
Stock  yield 3.2% 5.6%   3.87%     -1.6% 22.0% *   10.03% -7.6%   4.82%  
Table 5
Means of the continuous variables representing the firms’ characteristics14
quently. The differences are statistically 
significant for the ownership variable, 
confirming that in the firms without an 
important shareholder, managers volun-
tarily disclose more climate change in-
formation.    
As the results in Table 5 show, the oper-
ating characteristics of the environment 
committee within the board of directors 
seem to have an impact on the voluntary 
decision to disclose climate change in-
formation. In fact, although the number 
of meetings during the year do not ap-
pear to differ between a firm that dis-
closes climate change information and 
one that does not, when the number of 
members and the percentage of members 
are higher, the firms disclose more infor-
mation about their risks, their strategies 
to manage their GHG emissions and the 
impact of the GHG regulation on their 
operations. The differences are signifi-
cant for all types of disclosures concern-
ing the number of members and signifi-
cant only for the risk and the impact of 
the regulation on operations for the per-
centage of independent members. Posi-
tive relationships between the disclo-
sure, regardless of its nature, and both 
political exposure and media visibility 
are also observed; each difference is sta-
tistically significant. These results are 
consistent with those observed in past 
** Significant difference at the 0.05 level,* at the 0.10 level (one-tail t-test)  
13     Here too, the small number of firms audited by a 
non Big Four firm makes it impossible to carry out 
statistical tests.  
14   Considering that for certain variables, especially 
those related to the environment committee within the 
board of directors (representing only 23 observations), 
the statistical tests carried out and presented in Table 5 
are non parametrical Kruskal-Wallis tests. These tests 
can be conducted with a minimum group size of 5 ob-
servations and the size of the groups needs not be equal 
(Kanji, 2006). 
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studies (Stanny and Ely, 2008; Prado-
Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez, 2010).  
 
We extend the analysis to financial per-
formance by using two financial vari-
ables: the return on assets (ROA) (Prado
-Lorenzo et al., 2009; Rankin et al., 
2011) and the stock yield. The results 
are presented at the end of Table 5. The 
disclosing firms, whatever the nature of 
the disclosure, show better financial per-
formance measured with both the vari-
ables. However, the statistically signifi-
cant results are observed principally 
with the ROA. Except for strategies dis-
closure, the results are not significant 
with the stock yield measure. 
 
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
This study has two objectives. First, to 
examine to what extent Canadian oil and 
gas corporations have complied with the 
CICA proposed guidelines respecting 
climate change disclosures in the 
MD&A section or in other parts of their 
annual reports. Second, to examine 
whether these disclosures seem to be 
influenced by media visibility, the exis-
tence and operation of an environment 
committee within the board of directors, 
ownership structure, audit firm size, and 
the corporations’ political exposure.  
 
Overall, the findings indicate that Cana-
dian oil and gas firms disclose very little 
climate change information. In most 
cases, they provide details on the regula-
tion and disclose the impact of this regu-
lation on their operations. Information 
about risk and strategies to manage 
GHG emissions is very rare and nothing 
is published about key performance 
drivers. In fact, we can conclude that the 
firms seem follow the CICA proposed 
guidelines in their disclosures but possi-
bly do not meet the requirements of the 
Canadian markets securities in terms of 
scope and details. Like the results of 
Freedman and Jaggi (2005, 2011), Ran-
kin et al. (2011) and Solomon, Solomon, 
Norton and Joseph (2011), our results 
demonstrate that stakeholders’ informa-
tion needs are far from being filled and 
suggest that mandatory disclosure re-
quirements may be needed to ensure 
more extensive and reliable climate 
change disclosure so that investors and 
other stakeholders can make informed 
decisions (Freedman and Jaggi, 2011). 
The simple requirement of market secu-
rities commissions and proposed guide-
lines from accounting standard setters 
definitely do not seem to be sufficient. 
 
In spite of the low level of disclosure, 
some factors are related to companies’ 
inclination to disclose more information 
on climate change and GHG emissions. 
While an environment committee plays 
a positive role, a large number of firms 
have not set up such a committee. As 
concerns the other variables, our results 
confirm those of past studies. Like other 
types of voluntary disclosures, climate 
change disclosures by Canadian oil and 
gas firms seem to be related to the firm's 
widely held ownership structure, politi-
cal exposure, media visibility and finan-
cial performance (Cormier and Magnan, 
2003; Cormier and Gordon, 2001; Bew-
ley and Li, 2000; Alnajjar, 2000; Clark-
son et al., 1999; Brown and Deegan, 
1998; Deegan and Gordon, 1996; 
Dawkins and Fraas, 2011; Gamerschlag 
et al., 2011).  
 
This research has certain limitations. For 
example, we studied only Canadian oil 
and gas firms that are unanimously rec-
ognized as emitters of GHG. Accord-
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ingly, our results should not be extended 
to other sectors of activity or other coun-
tries. Note that size of the sample is lim-
ited, although a sizeable portion of the 
firms in this sector engaged in produc-
tion activities.  Moreover, our data cov-
ers only the year just before the CICA 
officially adopted the guidance. Never-
theless, the CICA Discussion Brief was 
proposed at the time covered by the an-
nual report, and at this time the Cana-
dian market authorities asked firms to 
disclose risk information in the MD&A 
section of their annual reports. The fact 
that Canada has also signed and ratified 
the Kyoto Protocol implies a tightening 
of requirements with respect to GHG 
emissions for oil and gas firms.   
 
These results raise some opportunities 
for future research. To verify whether 
reporting increases and improves over 
time, longitudinal studies should be 
completed to track the evolution of cli-
mate change disclosures over time. This 
can be also carried out in function of the 
political events related to compliance 
with and implementation of the Kyoto 
Protocol in Canada in a context of legiti-
macy theory. Given that Canada has the 
second largest reserves of crude oil in 
the world (Statistics Canada, 2009) and 
that Canadian oil and gas corporations 
are economically important, it would be 
interesting to compare the level and de-
tail of disclosures of these Canadian 
companies with those of firms from 
other countries. Finally, in terms of gov-
ernance, the responsibilities the board of 
directors grants to environment commit-
tees should be explored in detail to iden-
tify their possible impact on the level of 
voluntary climate change disclosures.  
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Anderson Energy Ltd. 
Antrirm Energy Inc. 
ARC Resources 
Bankers Petroleum Ltd. 
Berens Energy Ltd. 
Birchcliff Energy Ltd. 
Breaker Energy Ltd. 
Bronco Energy Ltd. 
Cadence Energy Inc. 
Canadian Natural Resources 
Candax Energy Inc. 
Caspian Energy Inc. 
Celtic Exploration Ltd. 
CInc.h Energy Inc. 
Comaplex Minerals Corp. 
Compton Petroleum Corp. 
Cork Exploration Inc. 
Corridor Resources Inc. 
Crocotta Energy Inc. 
Delphi Energy Corp. 
Diaz Resources Ltd. 
Duvernay Oil Corp. 
Ember Resources Inc. 
Encana Corp. 
Fairborne Energy Ltd. 
Galleon Energy Inc. 
Gentry Resources Ltd. 
Geocan Energy Inc. 
Gran Terra Energy Inc. 
Heritage Oil Corp. 
Highpine Oil & Gas Ltd. 
Husky Energy Inc. 
Imperial Oil Ltd. 
Jura Energy Inc. 
Mahalo Energy Corp. 
Midnight Oil Exploration Ltd. 
Nexen Inc. 
Niko Resources Ltd. 
Nuvista Energy Ltd. 
Open Range Energy Corp. 
Opti Canada Inc. 
Paramount Resources Ltd. 
Pebercan Inc. 
Petro Andina Resources 
Petrobank Energy & Res Ltd. 
Petro-Canada 
Petrolifera Petroleum Ltd. 
Proex Energy Ltd. 
Prospex Resources Ltd. 
Rock Energy Inc. 
Saxon Energy Services Inc. 
Bonnaterra / Silverwing Energy Inc. 
Storm Exploration Inc. 
Suncor Energy Inc. 
Synenco Energy Inc. 
Talisman Energy Inc. 
Trafalgar Energy Ltd. 
Transglobe Energy Corp. 
Tristar Oil & Gas Ltd. 
Twin Butte Energy Ltd. 
UTS Energy Corp. 
Verenex Energy Inc. 
Vero Energy Inc. 
Winstar Resources Ltd. 
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